Boca Raton Divorce Lawyer Blog

Jewelry is clearly a marital asset if acquired during the course of the marriage, and it is therefore subject to equitable distribution.

Placing a value on jewelry is a more difficult question. There is ample case law that sets forth the principle that valuations must be based upon competent evidence. Noone v. Noone, 727 So.2d 972, (Fla. 5th DCA 1998); see also Knecht v. Knecht, 629 So.2d 883 (Fla. 3d DCA 1993).

In Lassett v. Lassett, 768 So.2d 472 (Fla. 2d DCA 2000), the husband tesified that his wife's jewelry was valued at $10,000. There was no other evidence. The trial court stated that this was not competent evidence as to value. His unsupported opinion as to the value of the jewelry is not sufficient to warrant the distribution of that amount to the wife.

The only evidence the wife had as to the value of the husband's jewelry in the Noone case was that apparently he had told her it was worth $10,000 at some point in time. This was not considered competent evidence by the court. Alternatively, the husband valued his own jewelry at $1,500 on his financial affidavit, which the court deemed to be competent evidence.

In every dissolution of marriage action filed in Boca Raton, Fort Lauderdale, or anywhere else throughout the state of Florida, the parties are required to file a financial affidavit which details their income, expenses, assets and liabilities. The importance of filing this document in an accurate manner cannot be over emphasized.

What happens when assets are not disclosed by a party to the divorce proceeding?

In Romero v. Romero, 959 So.2d 333 (Fla. 3DCA 2007), the husband failed to disclose stock options he had received over the course of the marriage, and which the wife was unaware of. They were ultimately discovered by her after the proceedings concluded, and she subsequently tried to reach them through the use of a constructive trust.

The trial court concluded that these options were marital assets because they were awarded to the husband based upon his past qualifications and experience over the course of the marriage.

The wife testified that had she known about them, she would have wanted half; that she would have exercised them; she would have sold them, and would have used the proceeds to reduce the mortgage on her home.

The decision of the trial court, awarding the wife half of the options, was ultimately reversed on appeal. The appellate court ruled that the wife failed to establish the elements of fraud, and "impermissibly stacked inference upon inference, with the full benefit of hindsight, culminating in a final judgment based solely upon speculation."

What makes this case rather interesting is the fact that neither party completed a thorough examination of their assets when they drafted their marital settlement agreement. Given theses circumstances, the court concluded that the husband did not commit any fraud in not disclosing his stock options.

It is important to recognize that a petition to set aside a final judgment in a divorce case cannot be done simply because of non-disclosure on a financial affidavit. There must be more. The moving party must still establish a ground for setting aside the judgment pursuant to Florida Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 1.540(b)(3).

In other words, a movant must show not just that the affidavit contained a false statement of a material fact, but also that it was fraudulent, i.e., that the person making the false statement knew that it was false, that the false statement was made with the intent that the other party would rely on the false statement, and that the other party actually relied on the false statement and was thereby prejudiced. Ward v. Atl. Sec. Bank, 777 So.2d 1144, 1146 (Fla. 3d DC 2001).

The moral of the story is to exercise due diligence in not only completing your financial affidavit, but to also conduct your own extensive investigation into discovering the nature and extent of all marital assets. For more valuable information regarding this subject or any other subject that you may have an interest in, please click the following link which will take you over to my site, www.alanburtonlaw.com.

In every dissolution of marriage action, marital assets must be identified and valued. The critical question that is in dispute often times becomes as of what date are those assets to be valued?

Section 61.075(6), Florida Statutes (2004), provides a bright line rule for classifying marital assets and liabilities. Absent a valid separation agreement, the cut-off date for classifying marital assets is the date of filing the petition for dissolution of marriage. Schmitz v. Schmitz, 950 So.2d 462, 463 (Fla. 4th DCA 2007).

Often times, it is a much easier task to identify those assets which are marital, then it is to value them. The case of Odak v. Vitrano, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1957a (2010) is instructive on this point.

Another point of contention in this case involved the severance payment received by the husband. That payment was substantial. However, since the right to receive the payment did not come into existence until after the date the petition for dissolution of marriage was filed, the court had properly classified the severance payment as a non marital asset.

In this case the husband was an expert in "turning around" troubled companies. He was hired by Wild Oats Markets, Inc. as its president and chief operating officer for a number of years. He had received stock options from the company which he exercised during the marriage. The trial court chose to value those assets as of the date of the trial, as opposed to the date of filing the petition for dissolution of marriage.

The stock that the husband received apparently grew in value by a considerable amount between the date of filing the petition for dissolution of marriage annd the date of trial. The husband had argued that the increase in the value of the stock was occasioned by his post petition efforts to make the company more efficient and profitable, and therefore the proper valuation date should have been the date of filing the petition for dissolution of marriage, rather than the date of trial. It would have been unfair for the wife to benefit from his efforts made after the date of filing.

Although his arguument was very logical, the court sided with the wife with this issue, since there was conflicting evidence presented at trial as to what exactly was the cause of the stock rising in value. The trial court is afforded a wide latitude of discretion, and unless that discretion is abused, the decision cannot be reverersed on appeal.

Generally speaking, the answer is no. Settlements from personal injuries are the separate property of the injured person. A portion of an award, if itemized to cover lost wages, or if awarded for loss of consortium, may be considered as a marital asset. Rarely is a settlement itemized, breaking down how the total was derived. See Mazzorana v. Mazzorana, 703 So. 2d 1187, 1189 (Fla. 3d DCA 1997).

When a personal injury settlement is commingled with other funds which are marital, or which are placed into a joint account, the situation becomes much more challenging for a trial judge. This was the very situation which presented itself in the case of Valentine v. Van Sickle, 35 Fla. L. Weekly D1663a, 2d DCA 2010.

In the Valentine case, when the husband was out of town, the wife created a new joint account and deposited the personal injury settlement check into the joint account. A portion of the funds were used to pay marital debts. At some point down the road, the wife transferred all of the money into a bank account in her own name.
The trial judge apparently felt that because the award was deposited into a joint account, and were utilized, at least in part to pay marital debt, that the funds became a marital asset.

The appellate court, upon further review, determined that the trial court had applied an incorrect legal standard when deciding if the award was marital or not. The fact that funds are deposited into a joint account does not necessarily convert separate property into a marital asset. The court needs to "dig a bit deeper" and find out exactly why the funds were placed into a joint account. If the other party's name was on the account, the funds may have been placed in the particular account for convenience only, and the funds would not lose their separate character. Grieco v. Grieco, 917 So. 2d 1052 (Fla. 2d DCA 2006.

Extreme caution must be exercised when one receives funds which could be considered as separate property, and they become commingled. There is a high risk of those funds losing their separate character, so exercise caution.

More often than not, a divorce requires one to re-group and to start fresh. Usually, starting over is on a scaled down, reduced standard of living. No so with Tiger Woods.

In spite of the massive financial settlement he recently paid to his wife Elin Nordegren, which was reported to be in excess of $100million, he appears to have come out of his divorce unscathed, at least as to his finances.

South Florida Boca Raton attorney Alan R. Burton knows how a divorce can negatively impact the lives of individuals, especially when they were involved in long term marriages. It is generally more difficult for a family to maintain the same standard of living, when living apart, then when they were living together.

Tiger Woods has apparently been unaffected by this principle. He is nearing completion of his $50million mansion, with its own sports facilities, a golf course, what else?

Tiger Woods has become one of the wealthiest sportsmen of all time, earning in excess of $105million last year alone, as reported by Forbes magazine.

Although he apparently has unlimited wealth, that wealth alone did not bring him happiness in his marriage. The Tiger Woods saga adequately demonstrates the old adage that "money can't buy happiness".

Source: Daily Mail Reporter, September 6, 2010

This question frequently arises in the context of a subsequently filed bankruptcy proceeding. Generally, the obligor, or person who is obliged to make the lump sum alimony payment, seeks to have the payment or payments discharged through a bankruptcy proceeding.

The resolution of these types of situations is of course dependent upon the intent of the parties. The intent is ascertained by examining the language used in the parties agreement. Although the language used in an agreement is not conclusive, the words are given weight in determining the intent of the parties. Howell v. Howell, 207 So.2d 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968); Woodworth v. Woodworth, 385 So2d 1024 (Fla. 4th DCA 1980).

If the court ultimately determines that an obligation, which is labeled as alimony in an agreement, is in fact alimony, the alimony, which is lump sum, payable in installments, is is a vested right and not subject to modification. Such a determination would preclude the obligation from being discharged in bankruptcy, and would further subject the obligor to the contempt powers of the court if the obligation is not paid. Zuccarello v. Zuccarello, 429 So.2d 68 (Fla. 3d DCA 1983); McCombes v. McCombes, 440 So.2d 683 (Fla. 1st DCA 1983).

However, if the parties to an agreement had agreed that payments required under an agreement were for settlement of property rights, and not intended as alimony, those payments could not be enforceable by contempt, and would therefore be dischargeable in bankruptcy. Pabian v. Pabian, 480 So.2d 237 (Fla. 4th DCA 1985).

The contempt powers of the court simply cannot be used to punish someone for contempt, when the payments required from that individual are not support related. In Veiga v. State of Florida, 561 So.2d 1335, (15 Fla. L. Weekly D1487), the husband was found in criminal contempt for failing to pay his wife $25,000.00 as "lump sum alimony for purposes of equitable division of the interest in his business." Having determined that the obligation was for property settlement issues, rather than support, the contempt order was reversed. The payment then becomes a dischargeable obligation in bankruptcy.

It is very clear from the cases that emanate from Boca Raton, Palm Beach County, South Florida as well as throughout the state of Florida, that the only remedies for non payment of property obligations are those that are available to creditors against debtors. Underwood v. Underwood, 64 So.2d 281 (Fla. 1953); Hine v. Hine, 558 So.2d 496 (Fla. 3d DCA 1990); Carlin v. Carlin, 310 So.2d 403 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975); and Howell v. Howell, 207 So.2d 507 (Fla. 2d DCA 1968).

In conclusion, the lump sum alimony payments will only be dischargeable if the intent was to treat those payments as property rights versus a true alimony obligation. Extreme caution must be exercised in drafting any agreements so as to establish clearly the true intent of the partes.

Equitable Distribution of marital assets is governed by the provisions of Florida Statute 61.075(1). That section provides that, in distributing marital assets and liabilities, a court "must begin with the premise that the distribution should be equal, unless there is a justification for an unequal distribution based on all relevant factors...."

What factors then, would entitle the court to deviate from an equal distribution, and award one party more than the other?

When one spouse engages in conduct which results in the dissipation of marital assets, the court is warranted in making an unequal distribution. Hood v. Hood, Case No. 5D09-593, decided on July 30, 2010. Dissipation has been defined in the domestic relations context as "where one spouse uses marital funds for his or her own benefit and for a purpose unrelated to the marriage at a time when the marriage is undergoing an irreconcilable breakdown."

Adultery can be considered as a factor when the court is fashioning an unequal distribution of the marital assets and liabilities of the parties, to the extent that marital misconduct depleted marital resources. As an example, the wife, in the case of Rabbath v. Farid, 1st District, Case No. 1D07-6583 had alleged in her petition that her husband had dissipated over $383,551.00 in marital funds while engaging in an extra-marital relationship.

The husband gave evasive answers and failed to adequately account for his various banking records. A combination of the husband's evasive answers and other competent evidence presented by other witnesses justified the court in making an unequal distribution of marital assets.

Other cases make it very clear that when a party contributes and commingles substantial non- marital assets to the relationship, that factor alone is not a basis for an unequal division of marital assets. In Hitchcock v. Hitchcock, 4th District, Case Nos. 4D06-4743 & 07-1049, decided on October 22, 2008, the court made just such a finding. A presumptive gift occurs when non-marital assets are commingled with other marital assets.

Although a dog is viewed as a member of the family, no one in a divorce case is going to end up with custody of the pet.

A dog, or any other animal, is considered personal property, and personal property is divided between the parties pursuant to the equitable distribution provisions of Florida law. This means that there will be no fighting over custody and visitation privileges with the family pet.

The trial judge in Bennett v. Bennett, 20 Fla. L. Weekly, D225a didn't see it this way. The judge who presided over the case initially awarded custody of "Roddy", the family dog, to the husband, subject to alternating weekend visitation privileges for the wife. The ruling created a never ending stream of conflict between these two parties.

On appeal, the decision was reversed. The appellate court explained that a dog, or any other animal, is allocated to one party or the other as part of the equitable distribution of the marital assets. The pet is considered personal property, and there is no provision under Florida law to order either custody or visitation rights of a family pet.

Several cases on record establish this principal of law. Two that come to mind are County of Pasco v. Riehl, 620 So2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) and Levine v. Knowles, 197 So2d 329 (Fla 3d DCA 1967). Perhaps it would be a good idea for married couples to have two dogs, one for each of them, in the event of a divorce.