Boca Raton Divorce Lawyer Blog

Child custody issues, or extensive litigation in order to "win" the title of primary custodian should become a thing of the past. All of the reasons to litigate these issues have been abolished under Florida law.

Instead, Florida has adopted what is now referred to as time sharing with minor children, which is established under the provisions of a parenting plan. The requirements for a parenting plan are found in Florida Statute 61.13.

Furthermore, the trend today is approximating an equal time sharing arrangement whenever possible. Each case would be decided on its own merits, but if it is geographically feasible based upon the distance between the parents home, and consideration of other statutory factors as found in Florida Statute 61.13, the most likely outcome will be a 50-50 split.

The best interests of the child will always be the guiding principal in consideration of the court approving a parenting plan. The plan, at a minimum, must establish how the daily tasks associated with the upbringing of the child are to be apportioned; the times each parent is to have with the child; who is to be responsible for the health insurance for the child; and which parent's address is to be utilized for school purposes.

A parenting plan can be as detailed as the parties require, or it can simply cover the minimum requirements under Florida law.

Under Florida law, terms such as custodian, primary custodian,and any other use of the term custody have been abolished.

Florida has now adopted what is known as a parenting plan, the provisions of which can be found in Florida Statute 61.13 (2)(b). A parenting plan must include, at a minimum, certain things, as follows: a detailed description as to how the parents will share and be responsible for daily tasks associated with the upbringing of the child; the time-sharing schedule arrangements that specify the time that the minor child will spend with each parent; a designation of who will be responsible for any and all forms of health care, school-related matters including the address to be used for school boundary determination and registration, and other activities; and the methods and technologies that the parents will use to communicate with the child.

Developing a parenting plan is an individualized matter, and every plan should be tailored to your family. It is important to consult with an attorney who handles these child issues on a routine basis.

Alan R. Burton, Esq., a Boca Raton, Florida attorney, has been in practice for over thirty years, and deals primarily with divorce and other family law cases.

In 2008, the Florida legislature made substantial changes to the law in reference to minor children. The primary and most significant changes made by the 2008 amendments to section 61.13, Florida Statutes, was the abolishment of the terminology of "primary residential parent."
The effective date of the amendments were on October 1, 2008, and the changes were to have prospective application only. The changes could not be utilized to effectuate any modifications to agreements that were previously entered into by individuals prior to October 1, 2008. See the case of Hahn v. Hahn, (Fla. 4th DCA 2010).

The Hahn case is an interesting case to read. It clarifies many points of law that have arisen under the 2008 amendments to section 61.13. Although the designation of "primary residential parent" has been removed from the statute, the trial court is still required to consider the best interests of the child if called upon to create a parenting plan. The trial court must still "determine all matters relating to parenting and timesharing of each minor child of the parties in accordance with the best interests of the child. Section 61.13(2)(c)1., Florida Statute (2008)(amended October 1, 2008).

The Hahn case involved modification proceedings that were filed two years after the final judgment was entered, and before the effective date of the new statute. It was error on the part of the trial judge to apply retroactively the provisions of the new statute.

Obviously, the courts won't hesitate to enter any orders when necessary to protect minor children from harm. This would include orders for supervised visitation against a parent if the circumstances warranted this type of relief.

In the divorce proceedings between N.W. and M.W., 41 So.3d 383 (Fla. 2nd DCA 2010), the mother alleged that the father was sexually abusing the parties' daughter. As a result of those allegations, the father was restricted to supervised visits with his daughter. The father subsequently moved for unsupervised visits, and the mother moved to admit the child's hearsay testimony regarding the sexual abuse pursuant to section 90.803(23), Florida Statutes (2009). The court denied the mother's request, and re-instated the father's unsupervised visitation.

The mother filed a timely appeal, and the appellate court reinstated the order for supervised visitation. The court said that the trial court had applied the incorrect standard of law.

The proper standard for admitting hearsay statements of children was succinctly stated in State v. Townsend, 635 So.2d 949, 954 (Fla. 1994). The trial court has responsibility in ensuring that child hearsay statements satisfy a strict standard of reliability before admitting them as evidence. The trial court must make findings that satisfy two criteria:" (1) the source of the information through which the statement was reported must indicate trustworthiness; and (2) the time, content, and circumstances of the statement must reflect that the statement provides sufficient safeguards of reliability."

As the Townsend case makes clear, the focus on these types of cases is on the person to whom the statement was made by the child and the manner in which the statement was made.

The appellate court also noted that the mother sought to introduce statements made by the child to the mother, the grandmother, a therapist, and a family friend. The trial court's order was reversed because, as the appellate court found, the trial court made no findings with regard to any of these sources and also failed to address the individual statements and circumstances under which they were made.

The trial court neglected to follow the mandates of the Townsend case, as established by the Supreme Court of Florida.

If you or any of your family members require expertise in the admissability of hearsay evidence in order to protect a child from harm, you can contact me directly by clicking on my name, Alan R. Burton, Esq.

The issue of vacating temporary injunctions against domestic violence was dealt with in Schock v. Schock, 979 So.2d 1201 (Fla. 4th DCA 2008).

In this case the father had obtained injunctions against his child's mother, along with another one against her boyfriend. The allegations made included neglect and abuse against his daughter. The duty judge found the allegations appropriate for the issuance of an injunction, that the child involved was the victim of domestic violence, and was in immediate and present danger, and he issued the orders accordingly.

In response to all this, the mother filed an Emergency Motion For Return of Child and Change of Custody in the dissolution of marriage action that had been filed. Two days after the mother had filed her motions, the trial judge assigned to the divorce case entered two orders vacating the injunctions that had been previously entered by the duty judge.

The judge decided on his own that the allegations made by the father in his application for an injunction against the child's mother were conclusory, and those which were made against the boyfriend were based upon hearsay.

On appeal, the trial judge was reversed. The appellate court stated that once an injunction is issued under Section 741.30, Florida Statutes, the injunction cannot be vacated without a hearing. Sanchez v. State, 785 So.2d 672, 676 (Fla. 4th DCA 2001).

As a result of this ruling, the temporary injunctions were re-instated, and the trial court was instructed to conduct an evidentiary hearing before ruling on the motions filed by the mother. See also White v. Cannon, 778 So.2d 467, 467-68 (Fla. 3rd CA 2001).

For further information, advise, or any questions on this topic, please click the following link: www.alanburtonlaw.com

Although a dog is viewed as a member of the family, no one in a divorce case is going to end up with custody of the pet.

A dog, or any other animal, is considered personal property, and personal property is divided between the parties pursuant to the equitable distribution provisions of Florida law. This means that there will be no fighting over custody and visitation privileges with the family pet.

The trial judge in Bennett v. Bennett, 20 Fla. L. Weekly, D225a didn't see it this way. The judge who presided over the case initially awarded custody of "Roddy", the family dog, to the husband, subject to alternating weekend visitation privileges for the wife. The ruling created a never ending stream of conflict between these two parties.

On appeal, the decision was reversed. The appellate court explained that a dog, or any other animal, is allocated to one party or the other as part of the equitable distribution of the marital assets. The pet is considered personal property, and there is no provision under Florida law to order either custody or visitation rights of a family pet.

Several cases on record establish this principal of law. Two that come to mind are County of Pasco v. Riehl, 620 So2d 229 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993) and Levine v. Knowles, 197 So2d 329 (Fla 3d DCA 1967). Perhaps it would be a good idea for married couples to have two dogs, one for each of them, in the event of a divorce.